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Abstract: 
This paper examines how local governments adjust their spending, savings 
and taxes in response to a temporary revenue windfall generated by a hous-
ing boom and how they cope with the inevitable shortfall that appears during 
the bust. We focus on Spanish local governments given the intensity of the 
last housing boom-bust experienced there and the large share of construc-
tion-related revenues they obtain. We find, first, that just a small share of the 
boom windfall was saved, with revenues being used primarily to increase 
spending (above all, current spending) and (to a lesser extent) to cut taxes. 
Second, we find that the failure to save during the boom is higher in places 
with less informed voters and more contested elections. Third, we also exam-
ine the what happens during the bust, and find that these governments had to 
cut abruptly their spending (above all, capital), raise taxes, and allow deficits 
to grow. Finally, in places wit less informed voters and more contested elec-
tions local governments had more trouble in adjusting during the bust, and 
they tend to rely more on spending cuts than on tax increases. 
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‘The municipalities (…) see in housing construction their 
main and most tempting source of finance.’   
El País, 10/6/2006. 
 
‘The bursting of the real estate bubble hit the local council 
hard and construction revenues fell by 96%, leading to 
bankruptcy. Services were paralyzed; payments to workers 
and providers were delayed. Even council members went 
unpaid.’  
Eleconomista.es, 10/2/2011. 
 
1. Introduction  
News of unexpected increases in tax returns is generally considered good. Yet, a revenue 
windfall is often only temporary, turning into a shortfall with little warning. This is fre-
quently the case when a government is overly reliant on volatile revenue sources. An 
obvious example is the revenues obtained from oil royalties or other natural resources 
that fluctuate with the commodities’ international price. The current economic situation 
of Venezuela, for example, can be explained by the country’s failure to manage its oil 
revenues appropriately1. The same problem, however, can affect the revenues from tax-
es on such assets as company shares and real estate. A good example is that of California 
and the state budget’s excessive reliance on capital gains taxes, which makes the evolu-
tion of revenues overly sensitive to stock market developments2. Likewise, the collapse 
of the housing market in Spain generated similar problems for governments that had 
become too reliant on construction-related revenues (as the quotations introducing this 
article above remind us). Such situations require prudent fiscal management: windfall 
revenues obtained during a boom should, for the most part, be saved. The consequence 
of failing to save during the boom is fiscal stress during the bust when these revenues 
vanish, leading to abrupt cuts in spending and to deterioration in public services, and/or 
to tax increases.  
Here, we study how local governments react to temporary revenue windfalls at-
tributable to asset booms and how they cope with subsequent shortfalls. Earlier papers 
examining the ability of local governments to smooth spending faced the challenge of 
ensuring that actual revenue changes were not capturing the effects of permanent reve-
nue shocks. Our main contribution in this paper, therefore, is to overcome this problem 
by confirming the temporary nature of the windfall revenues. To do so, we draw on data 
from Spanish local governments for the period 1995-2011, years in which these gov-
ernments were affected by a huge, unexpected, temporary fluctuation in their revenues, 
                                                        
1 See, e.g., “The Endgame in Venezuela” (The Economist, 7/02/2016) or “How Venezuela Fell Into 
Crisis, and What Could Happen Next” (New York Times, 27/06/2016) 
2 This is well exemplified in a comment made by the spokesman for the state Department of Fi-
nance, H.D. Palmer: “We know another downturn is coming, we just don’t know when. So we 
don’t want to commit to ongoing high levels of spending – which was the mistake we made dur-
ing the dotcom boom”. See “California tax windfall: spend it or roll back that ‘temporary’ tax 
hike?”(The Christian Science Monitor, 05/20/2015). 
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attributable to the housing boom and bust. The reason for this abrupt swing in re-
sources lies in the fact that Spanish municipalities obtain a large share of their revenues 
from property transaction taxes, including a betterment tax, a tax on construction budg-
ets, development and building permit fees, and land sales proceeds (see section 3.1).  
Using data from local governments in Spain’s largest urban areas, we perform 
three different analyses. First, we study the average reaction to the boom windfalls. 
With this purpose, we estimate first-difference equations that relate changes in spend-
ing, savings and tax revenues from the start to the peak of the boom to changes in con-
struction-related revenues during the same period. Our preferred results come from 
equations estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), using the amount of vacant land 
at the beginning of the period (i.e., land classified as developable at some moment in the 
past but not yet developed at the start of the boom) as an instrument. The amount of va-
cant land to start with is a very powerful predictor of housing construction revenues. 
We claim that the amount of vacant land (at the start of a boom) is the result of growth 
forecasting errors made by local planners during the previous housing cycles and so it is 
close to being randomly allocated in space, after controlling for urban area fixed effects 
and within area accessibility. Our 2SLS results show that only a small proportion of the 
boom windfalls (around 25%) were saved for leaner times. Most of the extraordinary 
revenues were used to fund spending increases (around 65%) and tax cuts (around 
15%). Current spending was the most heavily affected item (accounting for 45% of the 
windfall), in particular, spending on wages (30%).  
Second, we seek to identify which local governments are least likely to save wind-
fall revenues during booms. Here, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that the quality 
of institutions matters considerably. Although formal legal and political institutions are 
the same across the Spanish geography, elements such as voter information (e.g., press 
readership) and electoral competition (e.g., margin of victory at local elections) do show 
considerable spatial variation. There are some papers showing that better-informed 
voters are less tolerant of fiscal profligacy (Brender, 2005; Arvate et al., 2009) and that 
the workings of local governments improve with voter information (Repetto, 2016; 
Ponzetto and Troiano, 2014). Some papers also provide evidence that contested elec-
tions introduce a short-term bias into public finance decisions (Pérignon et al., 2013; 
Bagchi, 2016). Thus, our second analysis will consist of examining the effects of indica-
tors of voter information and electoral competition on the failure to save during booms.  
What we find is striking. Local governments in municipalities with highly informed 
voters (one standard deviation above the mean in press circulation) save nearly all the 
windfall, whereas those in places with poorly informed voters (one standard deviation 
below the mean) squander the entire windfall (mostly through spending increases, but 
also through tax cuts). Electoral competition also has an effect on the ability to smooth 
spending and taxes over time: municipalities with low margins of victory at local elec-
tions tend to save a lower share of the windfall during booms and experience sharper 
adjustments during busts. These results are consistent with a model of policy myopia, in 
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which incumbents pander to the interests of voters in order to be re-elected. In the pa-
per we perform several additional exercises in order to discard that the results are gen-
erated by some alternative mechanism. We show, for example, that accounting for li-
quidity constraints (i.e., higher prior debt burdens) does not affect our findings on voter 
information and electoral competition. We are also able to discard that irrational bubble 
expectations (i.e., high degree of revenue persistence during the boom) are the explana-
tion of our results. 
Third, we also examine how local governments cope with the loss of construction 
revenues during the bust. We find that construction revenue shortfalls were followed by 
abrupt cuts in spending (around 70%), tax rises (14%) and deficits (16%). The spending 
adjustment mostly affected capital expenditures and had no effect at all on spending on 
wages. Moreover, we also show that voter information and electoral competition also 
have some effects on the reaction during the bust. Fiscal adjustment is slower in places 
with less informed voters and more contested elections; these governments also enact 
larger spending cuts but are incapable of raising enough taxes. 
The paper can be related to five different strands in the literature. First, there are 
the papers that study whether local governments are forward-looking agents (see e.g., 
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Dalhberg and Lindström, 1998; BØrge and Tovmo, 2009; 
Persson, 2015). These papers use dynamic panel data methods to estimate the effect of 
changes in revenues on changes in public consumption. We enhance this approach by 
better isolating the temporary shock, by using a new identification strategy, and by dig-
ging deeper into the mechanisms that can account for the results. Second, the paper can 
also be related to the literature on pro-cyclical budgeting (e.g., Gavin and Perotti, 1997). 
This strand has identified cyclical fluctuations in tax bases (e.g., Talvi and Vegh, 2005) 
and institutional quality (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Alesina et 
al., 2008) as sources of pro-cyclical behaviour. However, no studies to date have exam-
ined this issue with local data. Third, this paper is also related to recent studies examin-
ing the effects of electoral competition on policy myopia. See Bonfiglioni and Gancia 
(2013) and Herrera et al.  (2014) on the incentives to delay reforms; Matsen et al. 
(2016) on the over-exploitation of natural resources; Ponzetto and Troiano (2015) on 
underinvestment in education; Glaeser and Ponzetto (2015) and Bagchi (2016) on pen-
sion under-funding; and Pérignon et al. (2013) on government loan choices that conceal 
the long-run cost of debt. Some of these studies explicitly consider the role of voter in-
formation (e.g., Glaeser and Ponzetto, 2015, and Ponzetto and Troiano, 2014).3  
Fourth, we contribute to a broader literature that studies how local governments 
respond to windfalls in external revenues. For example, the ‘flypaper effect’ literature 
focuses on the relative share of spending vs. taxes in the reaction to increases in grants 
(see Hines and Thaler, 1995, for a survey). Our focus here is different inasmuch as we 
                                                        
8These papers are also related to a much broader strand in the literature studying the effects of 
media access on accountability (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010). 
Several studies also focus on education (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2007; Botero et al., 2013). 
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examine the effects of (temporary) revenue increases on savings. However, in common 
with various studies in this literature, we seek to improve methods of identification (see, 
e.g., Knight, 2002; Gordon, 2004; Dalhberg et al., 2008). Similarly, the ‘resource curse’ 
literature focuses on the effect of windfalls on levels of corruption and efficiency (see 
Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Ferraz and Monteiro, 2010; Brollo et al., 2013; BØrge et al., 
2015). Here, we analyse a different type of political failure: the inability to smooth 
spending and taxes over time. The effect of revenue volatility and the tendency to over-
exploit natural resources are subjects that have lately spawned various theoretical stud-
ies (see Robinson et al., 2015; Matsen et al., 2015). However, although the effects gener-
ated by asset booms are quite similar to those generated by natural resource booms, 
there are virtually no papers studying them (see, however, Vamvakidis, 2007, and Fer-
nández-Villaverde et al., 2013).  
Finally, we contribute to a recent strand of the literature that examines the effect on 
local budgets of the housing boom (Vlaicu and Whalley, 2011) and bust (Alm et al., 
2011; Lutz et al., 2011; Ihlanfeldt and Doerner, 2011; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2015). All 
these papers study the U.S. case and find mild effects, due to the stability of the property 
tax. As discussed, taxes based on property transactions are much more volatile. The tax-
ation of construction activity might not be a particularly relevant issue in the U.S., but 
the problem is not confined to Spain. In Europe, Ireland is the most similar case, alt-
hough the housing boom-bust affected the national government’s revenues (see, e.g., 
Keane, 2015). The European Commission and other institutions are concerned about the 
effects of asset booms windfalls on fiscal surveillance (see Morris & Schukrecht, 2007). 
Outside Europe, China has recently had to face similar problems4.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical frame-
work that helps us interpret the findings of our empirical analysis. Section 3 sets out the 
empirical analysis: we provide some institutional background on Spain, describe the 
identification strategy, and present the data. Section 4 presents the results. The last sec-
tion of the paper discusses policy implications and concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
We present a theoretical framework designed to help organize the different ‘stories’  
that might explain the responses, in terms of spending, savings and taxes, to a tempo-
rary windfall of revenues. We begin by examining the response of an informed politician 
who is concerned solely with welfare. We then analyse the case of an informed but of-
fice-seeking politician. Finally, we discuss the case of an uninformed politician that 
might not be aware about the temporary nature of the windfall. 
                                                        
4 In a recent report, the World Bank warned about the effects on budget sustainability of the 
over-reliance of Chinese local governments on revenues from land conversion (World Bank, 
2014) and some studies conclude that windfalls are bad for local governance (e.g., Kung and 
Chen, 2014). Another World Bank report extends these concerns to other countries (Peterson, 
2008). 
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2.1. Benevolent politician 
Let’s assume for the time being that the local incumbent cares solely about voter welfare 
and is fully aware of the temporary nature of the construction-revenue windfall. To keep 
the problem simple, we assume that the welfare of a representative voter can be ex-
pressed as:  
																																																															 = Ε(ln(	) + ln())                                                       (1) 
where  	 = 		 and  =  are the quality of local public services in periods 1 and 
2,  	 and  are local government spending in periods 1 and 2, and 	 and  denote the 
quality of the politicians. Let’s also assume for the time being that all politicians are of 
average quality, so 	 = = 1. The budget constraint of the local government in periods 
1 and 2 is 	 = 	 −  and  =  + , where 	 and  are exogenous flows of revenues, 
and  are savings. The inter-temporal budget constraint can be written as: 
                                                                	 +  = 	 +  =                                                             (2) 
Revenues are ordinary revenues t (i.e., that do not fluctuate) and the totally tem-
porary windfall of construction revenues c, so that 	 =  +  and  = . 
Finding  =  − 	, substituting this in (1) and maximizing w.r.t. 	 we obtain:  
																																																																						∗ = ∗ =  + 12 																																																														(3) 
which indicates that spending should be constant over time and in each period equal to 
the permanent revenues t plus ½ of the temporary windfall. So, in this case the marginal 
propensity to spend/save out of the temporary windfall is: 
																																																													
∗
 =
1
2 								and								
∗
 =
1
2																																																(4) 
This simply says that a substantial party of a temporary windfall should be saved5. 
This is a well-known result in consumption theory (Hall, 1978, and Japelli & Pistaferri, 
2013). Of course, the prediction will change if we relax the assumptions implicit in the 
framework. The propensity to spend could be higher with legal debt limits (BØrge and 
Tovmo, 2009), with liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989, and Persson, 2015), prudent but 
impatient politicians (see Craig et al., 2016), local multiplier effects (Suárez-Serrato and 
Wingender, 2016), or if the city infrastructure has to be upgraded as population size in-
creases. Some of these influences can be ruled out in our setting; for the others we will 
show they do not alter the interpretation of the results. First, debt limits were not an is-
sue in Spain during the period studied (see section 3.1 for a more detailed discussion). 
Second, liquidity constraints and governments limiting the size of the debt stock to 
avoid incurring excessive risk might be an issue given the low size and fiscal capacity of 
some governments, and we will account for that in the empirical analysis. Third, local 
multipliers are clearly not a problem given the small geographical scope of local gov-
                                                        
5 In our two-period model the windfall is equally split between the two periods; with ∞ periods 
the marginal propensity to consume in the present would be zero. 
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ernments and the low share of local taxes in personal income6. Fourth, infrastructure 
needs are really an issue and we deal with that by controlling for population growth and 
by showing the effects for capital and current spending separately.   
Note also that it is straightforward to introduce taxes in the model. The tax-
smoothing model also predicts that a (benevolent) government would not change tax 
rates in response to a temporary shock (see e.g., Barro, 1979). We can show that intro-
ducing taxes as a decision variable in our model has no effect at all on the response of 
savings to the temporary windfall; the prior reaction of spending would be split be-
tween spending increases and tax cuts, depending on the intensity of the preferences for 
public vs. private goods (results available upon request). 
2.2. Office-seeking politician 
Here we assume that the politician cares about residents’ welfare but also about their 
own re-election. Uninformed voters observe the quality of public services but are igno-
rant of spending and savings decisions. Therefore,  they tend to re-elect profligate politi-
cians. This provides incentives to the incumbent to spend in the first period in order to 
ensure re-election. Below, we present a simple accountability model that captures this 
intuition. The model is a dynamic career concerns model similar to those in Holmström 
(1999) and Bonfiglioni and Gancia (2013)7.  
Let’s now assume that politicians have different qualities, and that it is the function 
of elections to select the politician with the greatest quality. Voters do not observe poli-
ticians’ quality but know	 is distributed U[1 − 1/2, 1 + 1/2], with "() = 1 and 
density . They also know that quality persists over time and that an opponent of aver-
age quality will always substitute an incumbent losing the election.  
The objective function of the incumbent is: 
                                                                      # =  + $ + %$                                                             (5) 
where  is (expected) voter’s utility, R are the exogenous office rents in each period, 
and % is the (expected) probability of re-election.  
There are two types of voter: uninformed and informed. Before the elections, both 
types observe  and 	, but only informed voters are able to observe s and 	8. Thus, an 
                                                        
6 In an extension of the model we show that the local multiplier should be really high for this to 
be an issue. We allow permanent revenues to depend on local spending; with a multiplier of lo-
cal spending equal to 2 (the highest value estimated by Suárez-Serrato and Windgender, 2016, 
with US county data) and the actual income share of local revenues we get a marginal propensi-
ty to consume equal to 0.52 (instead of 0.5). Results are available upon request. 
7 Similar models have been used in the political budget cycle literature (e.g., Rogoff, 1990; Shi 
and Svensson, 2005; and Alt and Lassen, 2006).  
8 We assume that uninformed voters know the local housing market is booming and that as a re-
sult of on-going projects the government will obtain a revenue windfall. However, they are una-
ble to ascertain before the elections how much of the windfall the local government has spent. 
This assumption is justified on the grounds that the incumbent employs accounting tricks to 
conceal the real amount of her spending commitments. 
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uninformed voter is uncertain as to whether the high quality of public services is the re-
sult of profligacy (i.e., under-saving) or of the incumbent’s quality. Thus, the uninformed 
voter has to infer the incumbent’s quality as:  
																																																																											&	 = 		−̃	 																																																																			(6) 
The uninformed voter will re-elect the incumbent if she expects her quality to be 
greater than that of an opponent of average quality, so if 	&	 ≥ 1, that is if: 
																																																																									 ≥ 	 	 − 	 − ̃ 																																																																				(7)		
So, the probability of an uninformed voter voting for the incumbent is: 
																																																		%+ = 12 +  ,1 −
	 − 
	 − ̃- =
1
2 +  ,1 −
̃	
	-																																		(8) 
The situation differs in the case of informed voters. As they are aware of whether 
the incumbent is saving or not, they are able to judge her quality. They vote for the in-
cumbent if  ≥ 1 so the probability is %/ = 1/2. If 0 is the probability that the repre-
sentative voter is informed (which can also be interpreted as the proportion of informed 
voters), the re-election probability is		% = 0	%/ + (1 − 0)	%+, or: 
																																																																% = 12 + (1 − 0) ,1 −
̃	
	-																																															(9) 
And the effect of 	 (and s) on the probability of re-election is:  
																																																																		 %	 = −
%
 = (1 − 0)

	 																																																(10) 
where we use the fact that, in equilibrium with rational expectations, voters are able to 
perfectly infer 	 (and s): ̃	 = 	 and ̃ = 	(see Holmström, 1999). 
The incumbent maximizes U with respect to 	 taking into account (1), (2) and 
(10). The F.O.C. is:  
																																																 +
%
	 $ =
1
	∗ −
	1
 − 	∗ + (1 − 0)
$
	∗ = 0																													(11) 
Similarly, we can obtain the expression for 	∗: 
																																																																∗ = (1 +
(1 − 0)$)
(2 + (1 − 0)$) 																																																					(12) 
The responses of spending and savings to a construction-revenue windfall are:          
																												
∗
 =
(1 + (1 − 0)$)
(2 + (1 − 0)$) 								and								
∗
 =
1
(2 + (1 − 0)$)																			(13) 
An office-seeking politician has a marginal propensity to spend (save) out of a 
temporary windfall greater than that of a benevolent politician. Note that the propensity 
to spend/save now extends from ½ (in both cases) to one (zero). Note that the propen-
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sity to spend (save) decreases (increases) the better informed the voters are (i.e., so the 
lower 0) and the less competitive the elections are, represented by the  parameter, 
which measures the sensitivity of votes to policy: 
																																																	
	∗
0 = −
∗
0 =
−$
(2 + (1 − 0)$) 	≤ 0																																	(14a) 
																																																 
	∗
 = −
∗
 =
0$
(2 + (1 − 0)$) ≥ 0																																	(14b) 
The model’s main predictions are robust to a couple of changes. First, we could al-
low the incumbent to choose the amount of political rents. Including two types of spend-
ing can do this: wasteful (i.e., valued only by politicians) and useful (i.e., valued also by 
voters). The reaction of spending (useful + wasteful) to the temporary windfall would be 
greater than without wasteful spending9. Intuitively, this is because as the incumbent 
obtains more rent the probability of re-election falls and this has to be offset by a further 
increase in useful expenditures. However, the predictions regarding the level of voter in-
formation and political competition remain. Second, if we include taxes in the model 
with rents the results remain unchanged (the reaction of savings does not alter and the 
remaining is split between spending and taxes). In this variation, rent seeking could af-
fect the split between spending increases and tax cuts10, but not the overall reaction of 
savings (full results available upon request). 
2.3. Myopic politician 
Another possibility is that the politician is also uninformed or myopic. For instance, she 
might have imagined the shock to be more persistent than it was in reality. Note that a 
housing boom of an unprecedented magnitude characterized the period we are study-
ing. The possibility of agents developing irrational beliefs in this context quickly comes 
to mind (e.g., Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015). Various studies demonstrate that people do 
not readily forecast mean reversion processes of variables that grow sustainably over 
quite a long period (Fuster et al., 2010), which is what occurred in our case.  
It is easy to see that this would modify the predicted reaction to the windfall. As-
sume, for example, that revenues in period 2 are  =  + 8 where 8 ∈ [0,1] is the per-
sistence of the construction windfall ‘as perceived by the politician’. If the politician is 
benevolent her propensity to spend will be (1 + 8)/2 and if she is office-seeking the 
term (1 + 8) will multiply the expression in (13). So, in order to obtain some evidence 
concerning the role played by irrationality, we should look at whether the reaction to 
the windfall is mediated by a proxy of perceived persistence 8.  
                                                        
9 See Alesina et al. (2010) and Matsen et al. (2016) for alternative electoral agency models 
where elections with rent-seeking politicians also induce a short-term bias in budget decisions.  
10 Note that we do not study the intensity of the split between spending and taxes (the so-called 
‘flypaper effect’). This split might also be affected by institutional constraints faced by Spanish 
local governments (as e.g., limited tax autonomy, see section 3.1).  
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3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Institutional context 
Spain’s local public finances. Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, although most 
are quite small. The municipalities constitute multi-purpose governments, and their 
main spending categories coincide with responsibilities that elsewhere are typically as-
signed to local governments (i.e., environmental services, planning, urban infrastruc-
ture, transportation, welfare, etc.) with the exception of education, a responsibility as-
signed to Spain’s regional or autonomous governments. Local spending amounts to 
around 15% of public spending. Own revenues account for more than two thirds of cur-
rent revenues, the remaining third being met by grants (mostly unconditional). Two 
thirds of the municipalities’ own revenues come from taxes with the remaining third 
originating from user charges. The main taxes are the Property tax, the Local vehicle tax 
and the Local business tax, which account for 50, 25, and 10% of tax revenues, respec-
tively. Local governments have the autonomy to fix their own tax rates, albeit within 
certain limits. Maximum tax rates are generally non-binding, although minimum tax 
rates might be binding for municipalities with high fiscal capacity. This means that mu-
nicipalities that receive a huge windfall and which react by cutting taxes might hit the 
minimum and so, in practice, they may be constrained in their reaction. 
Construction revenues. Spain’s municipalities also generate extraordinary revenues, re-
lated in the main to housing construction. Chief among these is the Betterment tax, 
which is a capital gains tax on the land portion of a real estate transaction. The tax base 
is estimated using the current assessed value of land and the number of years since ac-
quisition. Second, there is the Construction tax, which is paid by the owner of a construc-
tion project (i.e., either the developer or the homeowner). The tax base is the construc-
tion budget. Both taxes have a single ad valorem tax rate, set by municipalities between 
certain limits. Most municipalities fix the maximum tax rate as allowed by law. Third, 
there are Developer’s fees, including Building permits and payments in exchange for de-
velopment duties. Developers have the duty to contribute a share of developed land 
(that part required for streets plus 10% of the developed land), or to provide the 
equivalent value in money (see Riera et al., 1991, for a detailed explanation). Fourth, 
there are revenues from Sales of land plots contributed by the developers.  
Figure 1 –which tracks the evolution of housing construction and of transactions- 
shows how these revenues fluctuated over the housing cycle. Note that construction 
revenues more than doubled during the boom (1995-2007) but then virtually disap-
peared in the bust (2008-2011).  This behaviour was particular of this type of revenue 
instruments; ordinary taxes (e.g., property tax) were no affected at all by these fluctua-
tions (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The oscillation was not only abrupt; it had a big 
impact on local budgets. Table 1 below shows that the share of these items in the reve-
nue budget jumped from 12% in 1995 to 21% in 2007, before falling again to 9% in 
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2011. In some municipalities, the reliance on construction revenues was even larger 
(see Figure A.3 in the Appendix), reaching more than half of the budget at some point11.  
Figure 1:  Construction revenues and the Housing boom & bust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Construction revenues in real terms; outlay data until 2011, 
budget forecasts for the remaining years. (2) All variables expressed as an 
index (1993=100). (3) Sources: Housing construction and Transactions 
form Ministerio  de Fomento (http://www.fomento. gob.es). Construction 
revenues: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Publicas (http:// 
www.minhap. gob.es) and own elaboration.  
Table 1:  Share of construction revenues in the budget in %  
       1995 2007 2011 
Ordinary revenues 80.82 70.37 83.10 
 Ordinary taxes and fees 46.82 40.05 49.59 
 
 Transfers (current) 33.98 30.32 40.42 
Extraordinary revenues 19.18 28.94 16.12 
 Construction revenues 11.76 21.27 9.02 
 Construction taxes 5.39 9.05 5.13 
 Construction fees 4.15 5.62 2.68 
 Sales of land plots 2.22 6.60 1.51 
 Transfers (capital) 7.42 7.67 7.10 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 
     
Notes: (1) Share of construction revenues measured over non-financial rev-
enues; (2) Outlay data; (3) See Table A.1 for definitions and data sources.  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es), “Base de da-
tos de liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales”. 
Some comments on the nature of these revenues are in order. First, some of these 
items are in fact intended to finance infrastructure, which means, in theory, the amount 
raised should be used to offset the building cost (Slack, 2002). If this were the case, 
however, no windfall would arise. In practice, this is of limited application, first, because 
                                                        
11 Good examples are the cities of Madrid and Valencia, where construction revenues represent-
ed a 50% and a 60% of the revenue budget in 2006. 
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developers’ duties also include the direct provision of the main infrastructure (includ-
ing, street paving, lighting, and sewage), meaning that revenues tend to exceed by sev-
eral factors the needs created by the urbanization process; second, because developers 
also provide lump-sum contributions (in land or in money) so that the community can 
obtain a share of urbanization profits12 (these contributions are not designed to match 
urbanization costs and thus constitute a windfall); and, third, because the regulations 
that should keep these revenues out of the current budget are either non-existent (in the 
case of taxes) or often circumvented (in the case of land sales).  
Debt limits. Spanish municipalities also have the autonomy to use debt to cover their 
capital spending. Capital projects are funded from current account savings, with ear-
marked capital transfers, extraordinary revenues (see above) and with debt. During the 
period under study, legally binding debt limits were in place. The debt burden and debt 
stock could not exceed 25% and 115% of current revenues, respectively. Reaching these 
thresholds does in theory trigger the imposition of a local adjustment plan that forces 
the accumulation of savings during a period of years. However, very few municipalities 
had reached this limit by the start of the boom. Despite this, many governments entered 
the boom period with a sizeable amount of debt inherited from the previous crisis. It is 
unclear as to whether this hindered access to finance in a period of plentiful credit, but it 
might have had some impact on low fiscal capacity municipalities, prompting a different 
reaction to the boom windfalls. The situation changed radically during the bust: alt-
hough formal debt limits were not tightened until 2011 (Lago and Solé-Ollé, 2016), cred-
it to local governments totally dried up during the financial crisis (Jensen and Bentolila, 
2016), affecting governments with high and low debt prior debt levels alike. 
3.2. Identification 
3.2.1. First-differences 
In order to study the reaction of local budgets to construction windfalls during the boom 
we estimate equations that relate changes in the average value of budget variables be-
tween a pre-boom period and a period corresponding to the peak of the boom to chang-
es in construction-related revenues per capita during the same period (see section 3.3 
for more details). Averaging over many years helps coping with the year-to-year volatili-
ty of construction revenues while using long-differences avoid having to model the 
short-run dynamics of fiscal decisions. It allows us also to study the response to the 
boom windfalls during the boom and during the bust in a quite intuitive manner.13  
A first estimation approach consists of using OLS on equations like:  
			Δ/;<=>>? = @A,=>>? ∗ Δ/;<=>>? + BA,=>>? ∗ C/;<D + EA,=>>? ∗ Δ/;<=>>? + F; + F< + G/;<A 		(15)   
                                                        
12 See Peterson (2008) for a review of ‘land value capture’ policies. Several of the construction-
related sources used in Spain follow the logic of sharing urbanization profits with citizens. 
13 See Charles et al. (2015), for a paper using a similar approach to study the effects of the US 
housing boom and bust on college enrolment.  
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With e we denote spending per capita and with c are construction revenues (also per 
capita). Δ is the first-differences operator and the super index boom indicates that the 
difference the variable has been computed between the pre-boom and the peak of the 
boom. The sub index i indicates municipality, j indicates urban area (i.e., j=1…62) and k 
indicates distance-to-central city interval (i.e., k=1…4, i.e., less than 5km, 5 to 10km, 10 
to 15km, and more than 15km). Similar equations are estimated for savings (s) and tax 
revenues (t)14.  
Note that by taking first differences we are getting rid of permanent differences 
across municipalities in the levels of budgetary variables and of construction revenues. 
In addition to that, the equation in (15) controls for base period municipality character-
istics that might be correlated with trends in the evolution of construction revenues 
(C/;<D ). A similar role is played by F; 	and	F<, which represent a set of urban area dummies 
and a set of distance-to-central-city interval dummies. These fixed effects aim at captur-
ing trends common to all municipalities in an urban area (or with the same level of with-
in area accessibility) that might at the same time correlated with developments in the 
housing market. The equation also controls for changes during the boom period in vari-
ables (Δy) that might be alternative channels of influence of housing construction on the 
budget. Two variables that stand out in this group is the change over the period in tax 
capacity from ordinary taxes and in population growth. Note, for instance, that housing 
construction might also have an effect on the growth of property tax revenues if new 
houses are larger, more expensive or assessed at higher values. Controlling for shocks in 
ordinary revenues (which tend to be much more persistent) is also important to cor-
rectly interpret the shocks in construction revenues as truly temporary. Also population 
growth may be related to additional infrastructural needs related to urbanization. Other 
variables we consider, are changes in personal income, building density (new construc-
tion might be more land intensive), changes in the share of immigrants and of old and 
young residents (which might influence the demand for local services).  
Similar equations are also estimated for the bust period: 
							ΔC/;<=+IJ = @A,=+IJ ∗ Δ/;<=>>? + BA,=+IJ ∗ C/;<D + EA,=+IJ ∗ Δ/;<=>>? + K;A + K<A + L/;<A 						(16)   
Note that in this case we look at the effects of boom windfalls (i.e., changes in construc-
tion revenues from the base period to the peak of the boom) on the reaction of budget 
variables during the bust (i.e., changes in spending, savings or tax revenues from the 
peak of the boom to the bust period). Since the shocks to construction revenues during 
the boom are completely mean reverting (i.e.,  Δ/=+IJ ≈ −Δ/=>>?, see section 3.3.2) the 
estimated coefficient in (16) will indicate whether the budget variables that where 
shown to react during the boom in a given way (e.g., spending increases or tax cuts) are 
                                                        
14From the budget identity (e≈s+c+t) it follows that the effects on spending, savings and tax rev-
enues should at to one. This abstracts from the possible effects on intergovernmental grants. 
However, our results will show that construction revenues did not have any impact on grants. 
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also adjusted during the bust back towards its pre-boom levels or instead stay at the 
levels reached at the peak of the boom.  
3.2.2. Instrumental variables 
The main threat to the estimation of the above equation by OLS is the possible endoge-
neity of construction revenues. Note that in Spain local governments are responsible for 
zoning regulations. Municipalities are in charge of drafting the Master Plan, which speci-
fies the areas under municipal jurisdiction where building is permitted, as well as the 
many regulations related to type of activity, building densities, and so on (see Solé-Ollé 
and Viladecans, 2012 and 2013). Local governments determine the amount of new land 
to be converted from rural to urban uses and this affects the amount of new construc-
tion in the coming years (see García et al., 2015, for evidence) and, thus, the amount of 
construction-related revenues. This suggests causality might actually run from spending 
(or from the other budget variables analysed) to construction revenues: municipalities 
might decide to allow for more construction in order to obtain funds to expand their 
budget or in order to fund tax cuts. This would bias the OLS coefficient of the spending 
and tax revenues equations upwards (in absolute value) and that of the savings equa-
tion downwards. In addition to this a problem of omitted variables might remain if we 
are not able to fully account for influences correlated with differential trends across 
municipalities in construction revenues.  
The difficulty in dealing with these issues within an OLS framework justifies the 
use of a different identification approach. We estimate the equations in (15) or (16) by 
2SLS, using as the instrument the amount of vacant land at the start of the boom, that is 
the amount of land already zoned for development in the past but not yet developed at 
the start of the boom. The first-stage equation looks like:  
												Δ/;<=>>? = 8 ∗ N/;<D + KA ∗ C/;<D + OA ∗ Δ/;<=>>? + P; + P< + Q/;<                   (17) 
Three main assumptions have to be fulfilled for N/D to be a valid instrument (see Angrist 
et al., 1996). First, vacant land should be able to predict the increase in construction 
revenues (i.e., 8 ≠ 	0). Moreover, we know that in order to avoid biased inferences the 
explanatory power of the instrument has to be substantial, that is the instrument has to 
be ‘strong’ (see Staiger and Stock, 1997). Second, vacant land should be assigned in a 
quasi-random way, which means that municipalities with high and low amounts of va-
cant land should not differ systematically from one another (this is the so-called ‘ignor-
ability’ assumption). Third, the effect of vacant land on spending (and other budget 
items) should be channeled exclusively through construction revenues (this is the so-
called ‘exclusion restriction’ assumption). In the paper we defend that vacant land ful-
fills the second and third assumptions conditional on controlling for the two sets of fixed 
effects mentioned above. Other controls also considered prove to be of no practical rele-
vance. Below we explain the logic behind the instrument and discuss in detail why we 
think it fulfills the three assumptions. 
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Instruments’ logic. For vacant land to explain the change in construction revenues 
these revenues should be sensitive to housing construction and the same time there 
should be more housing construction where there is more vacant land to start with. We 
think the first part of the statement is plausible given that most tax bases are computed 
with information on quantities (i.e., housing units build, transactions)15.  
           The second part of the statement depends on some peculiarities of land use regu-
lations in Spain. First, the Master Plan specifies the amount of vacant land to accommo-
date the growth needs of the municipality for a given period of time (i.e., between fifteen 
and twenty years)16. The amount of vacant land some years after the approval of the 
plan is equal to vacant land at the time of approval less the new construction during this 
period. This suggests that the vacant land some years after the approval of the plan can 
be considered as a forecast error (i.e., the difference between forecasted and real con-
struction). So, a given municipality might start a housing boom with a larger amount of 
vacant land because politicians were overly optimistic in their forecasts of housing de-
mand in previous housing cycles. Note that whether a local development project materi-
alizes or not is a highly uncertain event, and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of un-
fulfilled expectations in this respect17. Therefore, it is quite possible that real housing 
construction falls short of expectations some years after the plan is implemented.  
Second, the Master Plan is a legally binding document that creates rights for the 
landowners. This means that the development status of a land plot cannot be reverted to 
its previous use without properly compensating its owner (see Riera et al., 1991), some-
thing that Spanish local governments are generally not able to do. So, past planning 
forecast errors are virtually impossible to rectify. Third, the process of amending the 
plan is very complex and lengthy and the subsequent process of land assembly is also 
very slow18. During this process housing construction tends to slow down, either be-
cause of legal provisions (i.e., permitting stops while the plan is discussed), or because 
when the local government starts the process the plan already suffers from obsoles-
                                                        
15 Prices also play some role in the computation of the tax base but in most cases they are based 
on the assessed value of the property and are outdated due to property value reassessment lags. 
Also, municipalities building more need not necessarily face lower prices, since these are deter-
mined at the level of the whole urban area. It might even be that larger quantities mean higher 
prices; this might happen because the share of social housing (which price is lower than the 
market price) in new construction tends to be lower in municipalities that build more. 
16 The Spanish system is highly interventionist and rigid (see Riera et al., 1991). Most town 
planning responsibilities are in the hands of local governments. Municipalities draw up a Master 
Plan that classifies land as developed (already build-up), vacant (developable land though not yet 
build-up), and non-developable (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix for an illustration). Only a por-
tion of this last category is actually protected; most of it is not developable under the current 
plan but its status could change if a new plan decides so. The plan also specifies other regula-
tions as zoning uses (e.g., residential, retail, industrial) and building densities (see Riera, 1991).  
17 There are plenty of anecdotes from Spain on failed attempts to attract big plants and on its 
consequences for the amount of vacant industrial and retail land (see “The industrial Estate 
bubble explodes”, ElEconomista 22/10/2012).  
18 See Brooks and Lutz (2015) on how land use regulations affect land assembly for the US. 
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cence, which means that the amount (and type) or vacant land remaining is not enough 
to sustain the current rate of construction (Martínez-Mora and Sáez-Fernández, 2009).  
These three facts combined suggest that municipalities with higher stock vacant 
land at the beginning of a housing boom will experience more housing construction dur-
ing the following years. The municipalities with a lower stock of vacant land (those 
where the forecast was more accurate) will at some point start the process of amending 
the plan. However, it will take some time to do so and in the meanwhile (for the reasons 
commented above) housing construction will slow down. In contrast, municipalities 
with a large initial stock of vacant land (due to past forecast errors that could not be lat-
er fixed) will continue building at the same pace during the whole boom period19.  
Strength. The amount of vacant land has a significant impact on windfall revenues dur-
ing the boom, as verified by Figure 2. The upward slope is clear and the F-statistic is 
equal to 32.18. This holds despite the addition of urban area and distance-to-central-city 
interval fixed effects and of different types of control variables (see section 4.1).  
Figure 2:  Growth in Construction revenues v. Vacant land.  
 
                                                                                         ∆ cboom =  0.273 x Vacant land + 56.18 
                                                                              (4.39)***                                  (10.36)*** 
                                                                                                        R2 = 0.146 
                                                                                                   K-P stat. = 19.08  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) y-axis: Growth in construction revenues per capita between base 
period (1993-1995) and peak of the boom (2004-2007); x-axis= vacant land 
per capita in 1995. (2) t-values in parentheses, ***: significant at the 1% level; 
standard errors clustered by province. (4) K-P is Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic; the value of the Stock and Yogo weak identification test critical val-
ues at 10% maximal IV bias are is 16.38.  
Ignorability. As explained above, the stock of vacant land at the start of the boom is to 
some extent the result of the accumulation of past forecast errors in the demand for 
housing construction. These forecast errors might be quasi-random as far as some local 
governments do not err systematically more than others. There are some reasons this 
might not be the case in practice. For example, forecast errors might not be random if 
some urban areas systematically experience larger housing demand shocks than others. 
In these areas local governments might fear more the risk of falling short of land (which 
                                                        
19 See A.6 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of this story. 
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mean that very profitable projects might flight to another location) that about the possi-
bility of supplying too much land (which means that the land might be in the long run 
occupied by not so desirable projects). This suggests that the local planners of these 
places (taking into consideration these issues) will plausibly convert more land than in 
places that are not expected to grow that much. The way we deal with this issue is by in-
cluding urban area and distance-to-central-city interval dummies in the estimation. By 
looking at within area differences (and holding constant accessibility) we are controlling 
for housing demand shocks that are common to all municipalities in the area and also 
for the overall stock of vacant land available in the area. We expect that after controlling 
for urban area and distance-to-central-city interval dummies, differences in vacant land 
across municipalities will not be systematic. We think this is the case because it is less 
true that different locations inside an urban area (compared to different urban areas) 
grow systematically more than others; land supply is more constrained locally than 
across areas and, as some places are filled up, development moves to places that still 
have vacant land. Also, many locations inside a given urban area are close substitutes, 
especially if they are adjacent or located at the same distance from the central city.  
We perform several exercises in order to check the validity of this approach. First, 
we study the determinants of vacant land in 1995 (so before the start of the housing 
boom). We are able to show (see Table A.2 in the Appendix) that construction in previ-
ous housing cycles do have some ability to explain differences in vacant land at the start 
of the boom. However, their effect vanishes after including urban area and distance-to-
central-city interval dummies. Second, we explore the possibility that differences in 
preferences for or against development and or in the fiscal situation of the local gov-
ernment are correlated with the amount of vacant land20. We find that these variables 
have a low explanatory power and that none of them is statistically significant (see also 
Table A.2). At the end, it seems that there are no systematic differences in the stock of 
vacant land, at least after controlling for urban area and accessibility to the city centre. 
Third, as we will show in section 4.1, the introduction of any of these sets of variables in 
the equation (besides the fixed effects) has no effect on the estimation.  
Fourth, there might still be other determinants of vacant land that we are not tak-
ing into account, and that are correlated with trends in budget variables. To deal with 
this issue we run regressions using changes in the budget variables in a period prior to 
the housing boom (i.e., between 1993 and 1995) as dependent variable and vacant land 
                                                        
20 We control for political variables such as the vote margin and the vote share of left-wing par-
ties (at prior local elections), variables measuring voter preferences (i.e., income per capita in 
1995, % college education, % renters and % commuters, measured with 1991 census data), and 
budgetary variables (i.e., debt burden, spending, and assessed property value in 1995). Some of 
these variables have been shown to influence the amount of land converted from rural to urban 
uses and so on the amount of vacant land (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012 and 2013). How-
ever, they have also been shown to predict the amount of new construction in the years that fol-
lows the amendment of the plan; it is therefore unclear whether they should have any influence 
on the amount of vacant land remaining years after that. 
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at the start of the boom (in 1995) as an explanatory variable. The results indicate that 
vacant land is not correlated with changes in budget variables during this period, sug-
gesting budget variables do not have different pre-trends municipalities with high v. low 
stocks of vacant land (Table A.3 in the Appendix). 
Exclusion restriction. We accept that vacant land, by fuelling housing construction, may 
also have some effect on property tax revenues. In addition to this, housing construction 
might also have an effect on employment, which could, in turn, have an effect on vehicle 
and business tax bases. We, therefore, need to recognise the possibility that the estimat-
ed effect of temporary windfalls impacts other (perhaps more permanent) sources of 
revenues. Construction activity might also impact personal incomes and building densi-
ties, thus affecting the demand for and/or the costs of providing local services. We be-
lieve, however, that these effects might also be attenuated by the inclusion of urban area 
and distance-to-central-city interval dummies. Note, for instance, that the effect of va-
cant land on the property tax base depends on the response of housing prices, which is 
determined at the urban area level, and of the frequency of property reassessments, 
which are performed close in time for municipalities in the same housing market. The 
same can be said of the effects on employment or income, which spill over to other local-
ities in the area.  
We examine the seriousness of this issue by running different regressions using 
vacant land as the explanatory variable and changes in ordinary revenues (i.e., ordinary 
taxes plus grants), population growth, personal income,  building density, share of im-
migrants, and share of old and young residents. In all these regressions we control for 
urban area and distance-to-central-city dummies. We show (see Table A.4 in Appendix) 
that vacant land at the start of the boom does have a statistically significant effect on 
changes over the boom period in ordinary revenues (at the 5% level) and in population 
growth (at the 10% level), but not on changes in the other outcomes. However, the ef-
fect on the growth of ordinary revenues and on population growth is quite small, which 
means that the exclusion of these variables from the equation could hardly affect our es-
timates.  In fact, after including the fixed effects, neither the first-stage coefficient nor 
the second-stage results depend on controlling for these two variables (see section 4.1). 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Sample and period 
We focus on municipalities located in the largest Spanish urban areas21. There are sev-
eral reasons for this choice. First, these are the municipalities where the demand for 
housing was most intense and also where the notion of land regulation constraints 
                                                        
21 We had to exclude the urban areas of the Canary and Balearic Islands, because of difficulty in 
obtaining data on land uses, and the urban areas of the Basque Country and Navarra due to diffi-
culties in obtaining access to budgetary data for the whole period. 
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makes greatest sense22. Second, it is in urban areas that it makes also greatest sense to 
consider the different locations as substitutes, which is an important trait of our identi-
fication strategy. The urban area delimitations are provided by AUDES (http://alarcos. 
esi.uclmes/ per/fruiz/audes/) and are based on commuting patterns and the physical 
continuity of the build-out area. Major urban areas are defined as having a central city of 
at least 50,000 residents and a sizeable conurbation. This gives us here a total of 62 ur-
ban areas. We also restrict our attention to the municipalities inside these areas that 
have direct access to the road network, defined as having an expressway ramp or a di-
rect connection to a major two-lane road as of 1995. The road data comes from García et 
al. (2015). This excludes a number of municipalities that can be considered far from the 
central city in terms of travel time, and ensures that the municipalities inside an urban 
area are close substitutes.  
Reasons of data availability mean we have to focus on municipalities with a popu-
lation greater than 1,000 residents in all the years. This gives us a total of 456 munici-
palities. We have been able to assemble the required budget data for the whole period of 
analysis (1993-2011) for 311 of these. These data are drawn from a survey that covers 
all the largest municipalities (i.e., above 5,000 residents) and a sample of the smaller 
ones, and was undertaken by the Spanish Ministry of Finance. The selection of the small 
municipalities into the survey was in theory random so our final sample should be rep-
resentative. This intuition is confirmed after comparing the restricted sample to one 
that included all municipalities; the averages of the variables for which we have infor-
mation in both cases are very similar. 
3.3.2. Data sources  
Construction revenues. These are revenues derived from the Betterment tax and the 
Construction tax and from Developer’s fees and Sales of land (see section 3.1). These rev-
enues (as all the budget data) have been computed from outlay data and have been de-
flated using a provincial price index provided by the National Institute of Statistics 
(www.ine.es)23. Windfalls are increases in per capita revenues from these taxes between  
a base pre-boom period (1993-95) and a period covering the years at the peak of the 
boom (2004-07). Shortfalls are defined as decreases in revenues per capita from these 
taxes between the peak of the boom (2004-07) and the bust (2008-11)24,25.  Figure 3 
                                                        
22 Note for instance that many municipalities in rural areas do not have Master Plans and use 
simplified land planning mechanisms (see (Martínez-Mora and Sáez-Fernández, 2009). 
23 Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables. 
24 The start of the boom occurs not earlier than 1997 and it is not perceptible in most urban are-
as before of 1999. Nevertheless, we fix the pre-boom period in 1993-95 as to ensure that we 
measure both pre-boom budget variables and vacant land in a moment in time were there no 
expectations of housing construction growing again. 
25 The results are robust to changing the definitions of the boom and bust periods; they do not 
change qualitatively if we define the periods using just a two-year average (i.e., the peak of the 
boom as the years 2006 and 2007 and the valley of the bust as 2010 and 2011) or if we use one 
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shows that windfalls and shortfalls are perfectly negatively correlated: the extra reve-
nues obtained during the boom disappeared in the bust.  
Figure 3: Mean reversion in Construction Revenues 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             ∆ cbust =  -0.995 x ∆cboom + 22.31 
                                                                            (-51.50)***                    (8.54)*** 
                                     R2 = 0.901 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) y-axis: Growth in construction revenues per capita 
during the boom; x-axis= Growth in construction revenues per 
capita during the bust. (2) t-values in parentheses, ***: signifi-
cant at the 1% level; standard errors clustered by province. 
Budget data. Changes in all the budgetary variables studied are defined in the same way 
as for construction revenues: differences in real average outlays per capita between 
terms. Spending is total non-financial spending, Revenues are total non-financial reve-
nues (tax revenues – construction revenues + grants), and Savings are Revenues – 
Spending. In addition, we also analyse the breakdown of spending into Current and Cap-
ital spending, and the breakdown of current spending into Wages, Purchases and Trans-
fers.  Ordinary revenues are tax revenues + grants. These data have been used to com-
pute Net Savings (Current revenues – Current Spending – Debt principal), a variable 
used in the interaction analysis. 
Land use data. The amount of vacant land has been obtained from a database provided 
by the National Property Assessment Office (the so-called Catastro), which assesses 
property values across Spain. A by-product of the work undertaken to update its prop-
erty register is a complete database on the status of all land plots in Spain. This database 
can be accessed online (http://www.catastro.meh.es/esp/estadisticas.asp) and pro-
vides information of the amount of land classified, since 1995, as developed, developa-
ble (not yet developed but legally developable), and not developable. The amount of de-
velopable land is what we refer to here as vacant land; the value of this variable in 1995, 
in per capita terms, is what we use as our instrument26.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
year (i.e., 2007 and 2011). The results are also similar if we look at the increase between the 
pre-boom period and an earlier phase of the boom (e.g., the period 1999-2003). 
26 See Figure A.4 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration of the concept of vacant land and 
Figure A.5 for an example of the delineation of vacant land in a real Master Plan. 
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Control variables. We use a variety of control variables from a number of sources, the 
most important being the Housing Census for 2001 and 1991. This data source provides 
us with annual housing construction statistics, insofar as it records the year of construc-
tion of all housing in the country. This and the 1991 Population Census furnishes infor-
mation on the socio-demographic variables used here as controls (including, % renters 
and % commuters) and/or in the interaction analysis (including, % unemployed and % 
college education). Proxies for employment and income per capita are described in Ta-
ble A.1 in the Appendix. Building density has been computed as the build-out area (ac-
cording to the Cadastre database) and resident population.  
4. Results   
4.1. First stage  
In Table 2 we present the results obtained when estimating the first-stage equation, in-
cluding the different types of controls. In column (1), we do not include any controls; in 
column (2), we include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; in 
column (3), we also control for housing demand (i.e., past housing growth and popula-
tion size); in column (4), we include variables that proxy for fiscal stress (spending, debt 
burden, and property tax base) and political (voting margin and left-wing voting) and 
citizen preferences (personal income, % renters, % commuters, and % college educat-
ed); and, finally, in column (5), we control for changes over the boom period in variables 
that might constitute alternative channels of influence of housing construction on local 
budgets (i.e., ordinary revenues and population growth).  
Table 2:  First stage results 
 Windfall revenues p.c. (∆cboom) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vacant land p.c. (S0) 0.273 
(4.39)*** 
0.234 
(4.21)*** 
0.225 
(4.13)*** 
0.210 
(4.71)*** 
0.219 
(4.01)*** 
      
      
R2 (adj.) 0.145 0.406 0.423 0.425 0.483 
K-P Statistic 19.08 
 
18.33 
 
18.80 
 
19.02 
 
17.21 
 
 [16.38 / 8.96 / 6.66] 
      
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central city fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand  NO NO YES NO NO 
  Preferences and fiscal stress NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      Notes: (1) Dependent variable is windfall revenues per capita (i.e., increase in construction revenues 
per capita during the boom period); (2) Sample: municipalities in larger Spanish urban areas larger 
than 1,000 inhabitants and with access to the main road network (N=311); (3) t-statistic in parenthe-
sis; ***. ** & *=statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard error clustered by 
province; (4) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identifi-
cation test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias.  
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Table 2 highlights the stability of the coefficient. Only after including the fixed ef-
fects does the first-stage coefficient fall slightly. The introduction of the other controls 
does not change the outcomes at all. The instrument appears to be strong in all cases, 
given that the Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk statistic is always higher than the Stock-Yogo 
weak ID test critical value at a 10% maximal IV bias. 
4.2. The boom  
In Table 3 we present the 2SLS results for spending, savings, and tax revenues, sequen-
tially adding the different sets of controls as in Table 2. In the case of spending, the coef-
ficient falls from around 0.9 when no controls are included to around 0.65 when we add 
the fixed effects. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level; neither the 
value of the coefficient nor its statistical significance changes when other controls are 
included. The coefficients of savings and tax revenues also remain stable after adding 
the fixed effects. In the case of savings, the coefficient rises from zero to around 0.25, but 
the estimation of this effect is very imprecise. The effect on tax revenues is around -0.1, 
and becomes statistically significant at the 10% level after the inclusion of the fixed ef-
fects. The results suggest that for every 100 euros of windfall, around 25 were saved and 
around two thirds were used to fund spending increases. This latter result is statistically 
different from zero at the 1% level, so we can conclude that Spanish local governments 
do not smooth their spending over time and seem to overreact to temporary windfalls in 
construction revenues.  
Table 3: Average effect on main budget items. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c. (∆cboom) 0.891 
(4.25)*** 
0.652 
(2.41)*** 
0.647 
(2.48)*** 
0.630 
(2.44)** 
0.651 
(2.19)** 
      
      
 (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c. (∆cboom) 
0.009 
   (0.04) 
0.251 
(1.52) 
0.264 
(1.40) 
0.251 
(1.55) 
0.243 
(1.41) 
            
  
 (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
  
      
Construction revenues p.c. (∆cboom) 
-0.100 
   (-1.29) 
-0.115 
(-1.84)* 
-0.120 
(-1.88)* 
-0.113 
(-1.92)* 
-0.125 
(-1.73)* 
      
      
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central-city fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand   NO NO YES NO NO 
Preferences and fiscal stress  NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      
    Notes:  See Table 2. 
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The OLS results (see Table A.5 in the Appendix) suggest an even higher degree of 
over-spending (under-savings), since the spending coefficient is around one and the sav-
ings and taxes coefficients are zero, and do not change very much when fixed effects and 
the control variables are included. A Hausman test verifies that the 2SLS and the OLS are 
statistically different. The difference between the 2SLS and the OLS coefficients suggests 
that the OLS results are upwardly biased for spending and taxes (in absolute value) and 
downward biased for savings. This might be due, among many possibilities, to the fact 
that the municipalities that expand their spending budgets or that cut taxes most are al-
so the ones that convert more land and obtain larger windfalls.  
Table 4: Average effect on detailed budget items. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
 Spending Revenues 
 
Capital 
Current  Tax Revenues 
Grants 
 Total Wage Transfers Property  Other 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 0.209 
(1.97)** 
0.448 
(3.56)*** 
0.281 
(3.45)*** 
0.167 
(1.67)* 
-0.100 
(-2.57)*** 
-0.015 
(-0.31) 
0.051 
(0.20) 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 
3. (2) See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. 
Table 4 presents the 2SLS results for a detailed breakdown of the budget catego-
ries27. First, we show that the spending response is allocated as follows: two thirds goes 
to current spending (45 out of each 100 euros of windfalls) and one third to capital 
spending (19 euros). Even if we consider the capital spending response difficult to in-
terpret (since this spending might either bring future benefits and/or is influenced by 
liquidity constraints), the effect on current spending is still quite large. Note also that 
the spending response is dedicated mainly to wages (29 euros or two thirds of the 
spending response). Due to the lack of a more detailed breakdown for this spending 
type, we are unable to say whether this spending is made up of salary raises, new per-
manent hires or just temporary jobs. Note, however, that since both cutting salaries and 
laying off workers are politically costly or even impossible in Spain (for permanent pub-
lic servants), assuming this type of commitment out of a temporary windfall might entail 
certain financial risks.  
4.3. Heterogeneous effects 
In this section we investigate whether the failure to smooth spending and taxes over 
time is a generalized problem of all Spanish municipalities or, instead, there are differ-
ences among them. The model presented in section two suggests that the propensity to 
spend out of the construction revenue windfall will be larger in places with poorly in-
formed voters and contested elections. So, first, we estimate equations that include in-
teractions between the increase in construction revenues and proxies of voter infor-
                                                        
27 Here we report results controlling for just for fixed effects but the results when including the 
different sets of controls (available upon request) are similar. 
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mation and electoral competition. After that we look at whether the results regarding 
these interactions are robust to the inclusion of additional interactions that account for 
alternative explanations: liquidity constraints and irrational expectations. For example, 
in the case of spending, we will estimate the following equation: 
					Δ/;<=>>? = T@ + O ∗ U/;<D + V ∗ W/;<D X ∗ Δ/=>>? + Y ∗ U/;<D + Z ∗ W/;<D + [; + [< + \/    (18) 
where U/;<D  represents a variable measuring either for voter information or electoral 
competition and  W/;<D  represent potential confounders, that is, variables that might be 
correlated with voter information and which could also plausibly have an effect on the 
reaction to the windfall, according to some alternative story. The variables in U/;<D  and 
W/;<D  are demeaned. This means, for example, that the parameter @ tell us about the effect 
of a voter information variable at the mean while O measures the effect at different lev-
els above or below the mean. 
The variables included in U/;<D  are the following. First, we use a proxy of press cir-
culation at the start of the boom (i.e., number of newspapers sold per capita). This vari-
able has been selected because it fits our theory well and because they have been used 
previously in the literature (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002). Second, we use a proxy of 
political competition, measured as the difference between the voting shares of the two 
most voted parties at local elections prior to the period of analysis. Similar variables 
have also been used in the literature (e.g., Besley et al., 2010). Our variable is measured 
prior to the period of analysis in order to avoid picking up any impact from windfalls on 
electoral competition. Third, we also present some results with alternative variables, 
namely, the share of residents with college education, the tenure in office of the main 
party in the local government (i.e., the number of terms this party held the mayoralty 
since 1979), and the number of civic associations per capita. The first variable can be is 
also a proxy of voter information and has also been used in the literature (Arvate et al., 
2009). The second one is an alternative measure of electoral competition. The third one 
is a measure of social capital; some authors suggest that social capital, in addition to 
voter information, might also enhance accountability (Ponzetto and Troiano, 2014).  
The variables included in W/;<D  are the following. First, we add interactions with 
proxies for the strength of the liquidity constraints. The main variable we use is net sav-
ings per capita at the start of the boom, where net savings are defined as current savings 
(current revenues – current spending including interest payments) less debt principal. 
Net savings are low when the debt burden is large and/or revenues low and it is there-
fore an indicator of the capacity to repay the debt. This indicator is used by higher layers 
of government in charge to oversee the financial situation of municipalities and also by 
lenders. Additionally, to see whether the results are robust to the choice of any particu-
lar proxy for the financial situation of the municipality, we will repeat the analysis using 
other variables: debt burden per capita, ordinary revenues per capita, and net savings 
and debt burden as a share of ordinary revenues.  
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Third, we also add interactions with variables that aim to measure whether local 
politicians hold irrational expectations with respect to the possible future evolution of 
construction revenues. As we already explained in section two, if the ‘perceived’ level of 
persistence of construction revenues is larger than zero, the temporary windfall might 
end up being considered as permanent. The long housing boom period coupled with the 
tendency to extrapolate the evolution of revenues based on recent information might 
explain this behaviour (see e.g., Fuster et al., 2012). The main variable we use to proxy 
for these influences is an estimate of the persistence parameter ρ; we assume that at the 
peak of the boom local politicians were forecasting future construction revenues as 8] 
and that 8] was obtained after observing how construction revenues evolved during the 
different phases of the boom. More concretely, what we do is to use municipal level data 
to run regression between construction revenues per capita averaged for the period 
2004-2007 and construction revenues per capita during 1999-2003. We run the regres-
sion separately for each Spanish province and the estimated coefficient is our proxy for 
the perceived perception of construction revenues. The logic of this procedure is that in 
places where construction revenues during the peak of the boom remained as high as in 
the first phase of the boom we could expect that local politicians may have been con-
fused about the true nature of the windfall. In addition to this variable, we will repeat 
the analysis including interactions with the average annual growth rate of housing pric-
es during the boom and also with the average annual rate of housing construction. The 
idea here is that places with higher price appreciation and/or more construction during 
the period we focus on could have developed more irrational expectations.    
The sources for these variables are as follows. Press circulation is computed at the 
provincial level (there are 50 provinces in Spain) as the number of daily newspapers 
sold per capita in 1995. This is the best statistic we can obtain for the mid-1990s28. The 
electoral competition variable has been computed as the difference between the first 
and second most voted parties at the two local elections immediately prior to our period 
of analysis (i.e., those held between 1979 and 1995). The Ministry of the Interior pro-
vides these data. The data on Civic associations also comes from the Ministry of the Inte-
rior and is also measured at the provincial level. Housing price data are provided by the 
Spanish Ministry of Public Works and are measured at the provincial level. Housing con-
struction data comes from the census. 
Fiscal myopia. In Table 5 we examine the effect of the level of voter information and 
electoral competition on the reactions in local government spending (columns 1 to 3) , 
savings (columns 4 to 6) and taxes (columns 7 to 9) during the boom. In columns 1, 4 
and 7 we present the results when including in the equation an interaction with the lev-
el of press circulation. Columns 2, 5 and 8 present the results with an interaction with 
                                                        
28 The information comes from the Spanish media association (AIMC, www.aimc.es). For more 
recent periods, press circulation survey data could also be used (see www.cis.es). The two vari-
ables are, however, very highly correlated (results upon request). 
 25
the vote margin. In columns 3, 6 and 9 we introduce the two interactions at the same 
time. In the case of spending, the coefficients of the interacted variables are always neg-
ative, indicating that places with less informed voters and with more contested elections 
overspend more. Similar results are obtained for savings. In the case of tax revenues the 
interaction coefficient is positive (suggesting that in places with more informed voters 
taxes are cut less when there is a windfall) but they are very small and the standard er-
rors are quite large.  
Table 5: Fiscal myopia. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias.  
To gauge the quantitative relevance of these findings it is better to consider the 
marginal effects, which are reported in Figure 4. Panel (a) shows that the level of voter 
information has a sizable impact on the response recorded by spending and savings to 
temporary windfalls. Notice that if we take into consideration one standard deviation in 
press circulation below/above the average (indicated by the long-dashed vertical lines), 
the marginal propensity to spend moves from one to zero. The graph confirms that in 
the case of tax revenues the marginal effect is growing with the vote margin but remains 
small and it is not statistically different from zero for the whole range of values of the in-
teracted variable.  
Panel (b) displays the marginal effects for the vote margin variable. Note from the 
graph that the range of variation of the marginal propensity to spend out of the windfall 
is lower that it was in the case of press circulation. At one standard deviation below the 
average the marginal propensity to spend is again 1 but at one standard deviation above 
the average it is just 0.5. Note that in any case, however, due to the fact that the interact-
ed coefficient is less precisely estimated, we cannot reject the null that these two values 
are one and zero, respectively. The effects on savings are similar: at one standard devia-
tion below (above) the average the marginal propensity to save is zero (one half). We 
cannot reject the null that the marginal propensity to spend is zero in the first case, but 
we can reject the null that it is one in the second. Finally, the marginal effects are quite 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 
0.673 
(3.59)*** 
0.682 
(2.77)*** 
0.628 
(2.96)*** 
0.223 
(1.42) 
0.184 
(1.56) 
0.182 
(1.63) 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.116 
(-2.02)** 
-0.123 
(-2.23)** 
  × Press  circulation  p.c. -0.016 
(-2.53)** 
--.-- 
-0.015 
(-2.23)** 
0.019 
(3.04)*** 
--.-- 
0.015 
(2.19)** 
0.002 
(1.08) 
--.-- 
0.002 
(1.14) 
  × % Vote margin 
--.-- 
-0.022 
(-1.47) 
 
-0.008 
(-1.56) 
 
--.-- 
0.028 
(2.30)** 
0.018 
(1.32) 
--.-- 
0.009 
(1.48) 
0.009 
(1.28) 
K-P statistic 9.64 8.935 6.95 9.64 8.935 6.95 9.64 8.935 6.95 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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flat in the case of tax revenues. Here the slope of the graph also suggests that higher vote 
margins mean lower tax cuts in response to the windfalls, but the effect is very small. 
To see whether these results are due to the use of some specific variables, we re-
peated the analysis using other measures of voter information and electoral competi-
tion. We used the share of college-educated residents as an alternative measure of polit-
ical competition and the tenure in office in the local government (i.e., the number of 
terms of office since 1979 during which the main party held the mayoralty). We also in-
troduced an interaction with the number of civic associations per capita, which is a 
common measure of social capital. These results are presented in Table A.6 in the Ap-
pendix. The results regarding the first two variables are quite similar to the ones pre-
sented above: the interactions with the share of college residents and with turnover are 
statistically significant in the case of spending and savings and the size of the effect is 
quite big. The marginal effects graphs (available upon request) are very similar to the 
ones presented above for press circulation and vote margin. Finally, the results are not 
affected at all by the number of civic associations (whose coefficient is positive but very 
small and not statistically significant).  
Figure 4: Fiscal myopia. Boom period. Marginal effects. 
(i) Spending p.c. (∆eboom). (ii) Savings p.c. (∆sboom). (iii) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom). 
Panel (a): Press circulation p.c. 
   
Panel (a): % Vote margin 
   
Notes: (1) Effect of an increase in construction revenues during the boom at different levels of Press circulation and 
% Vote margin. (2) Marginal effects computed using results from column (3) of Table 6. 
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Alternative stories. In Tables 6 and 7 we examine two other possible sources of heter-
ogeneity in the response of the budget variables to construction windfalls.  Table 6 ex-
plore the role of liquidity constraints. With this purpose we add to the equation an in-
teraction between windfall revenues and net savings per capita. Columns (1), (4) and 
(7) include this interaction alone; columns (2), (5) and (8) also add the interaction with 
press circulation, and columns (3), (6) and (9) the interaction with vote margin. The re-
sults reported in the table show that the coefficient of the interaction with net savings is 
negative in the case of the spending and the tax revenues equations and null in the case 
of savings. This suggests that municipalities with a small amount of savings use the 
windfall to a larger extent to increase spending and less to cut taxes, with no overall ef-
fect on savings. Note that this behaviour is not consistent with a liquidity constraint. In 
any case, the quantitative effect of this variable is very small irrespective of the level of 
net savings, as it is revealed by a flat profile of the marginal effect graph (which is avail-
able upon request). It seems that Spanish municipalities don’t seem to be liquidity con-
strained during the boom period. The results also reveal that the coefficients of the in-
teraction with press circulation and vote margin are not affected by the inclusion of the 
interaction with net savings.  
To discard that these results are due to the particular variable used to proxy for li-
quidity constraints, we repeated the analysis using other variables: debt burden per 
capita, ordinary revenues per capita, and net savings and debt burden as a percentage of 
ordinary revenues. None of these variables seem to have any influence on the reaction of 
budget variables to construction revenue windfalls (results are available upon request). 
Table 6: Liquidity constraints. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
Table 7 inquires into the role of irrational expectations. We include in the equa-
tions an interaction between the windfall variable and a proxy for the degree of persis-
tence of construction revenues during the boom. The proxy of revenue persistence is 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 
0.634 
(2.80)*** 
0.633 
(2.07)*** 
0.667 
(2.19)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.210 
(1.60) 
0.236 
(2.01)** 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.091 
(-1.67)* 
-0.088 
(-1.81)* 
   × Net savings p.c. -0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
  × Press  circulation  p.c. --.-- 
-0.018 
(-2.24)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.017 
(2.13)** 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
--.-- 
  × % Vote margin 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.020 
(-1.44) 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.025 
(1.43) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.25) 
K-P statistic 9.83 8.40 7.59 9.83 8.40 7.59 9.83 8.40 7.59 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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computed as the coefficient of a regression between construction revenues per capita at 
the peak of the boom (2004-2007) and construction revenues during the period 1999-
2003. We use municipal level data to estimate a different value for each province. The 
average value of the estimated value is 1, indicating a high degree of persistence across 
the different phases of the boom. The value of this indicator is however quite heteroge-
neous, going from 0.5 to 1.5, with a standard deviation of 0.2. The results obtained when 
introducing this interaction alone are reported in columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 7 for 
spending, savings and tax revenues, respectively. The interaction coefficient is not sta-
tistically significant, but a look at the marginal effects (available upon request) would 
reveal that the reaction to windfalls changes with the degree of revenue persistence. 
This effect, however, vanishes once we introduce again the interactions with press cir-
culation and vote margin. Note that now the coefficient of the interaction with revenue 
persistence drops to a very low value and the standard errors grew also a lot. Note also 
that the coefficients on the interactions with the fiscal myopia proxies are very similar 
to the ones reported in Table 5.  
Table 7: Irrational expectations. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
Again, to discard that these results are due to the use of a particular variable, we 
repeat the results using other proxies of the intensity of the housing boom: average an-
nual growth rate of housing prices during the boom and average annual rate of housing 
construction. The results are very similar to those of Table 7: the interaction coefficient 
is very small and not statistically significant and the results regarding voter information 
and electoral competition remain. The results also remain when we use other variables 
(i.e., % of college educated or tenure in office) to run the horserace the fiscal myopia and 
the irrational expectations stories. Summing up, the results presented in this section 
suggest that the municipalities with less informed voters and more contested elections 
reacted to the windfall with larger spending increases and tax cuts. Municipalities expe-
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 
0.638 
(2.82)*** 
0.647 
(2.12)** 
0.630 
(2.32)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.234 
(1.68)* 
0.242 
(1.83)* 
-0.100 
(-1.94)* 
-0.120 
(-2.00)** 
-0.121 
(-2.18)** 
  × Revenue persistence 0.567 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(0.032) 
0.032 
(0.210) 
0.123 
(1.02) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
0.024 
(0.165) 
-0.092 
(-1.17) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
  × Press  circulation  p.c. --.-- 
-0.020 
(-2.04)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.021 
(2.45)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.003 
(0.63) 
--.-- 
  × % Vote margin 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.020 
(-1.54) 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.014 
(1.60) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.42) 
K-P statistic 10.23 8.44 7.55 10.23 8.44 7.55 10.23 8.44 7.55 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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riencing more financial trouble or in the midst of a more intense housing boom do not 
seem to have a lower propensity to save the windfall revenues during the boom.  
4.4. The bust  
In this section we present the results of the estimation of the effect of the construction 
revenue windfall obtained during the boom on the evolution of the different fiscal out-
comes during the bust. We first describe the average results and then look again into the 
heterogeneous responses.   
Average results. The methodology used to estimate the effect of boom windfalls on the 
reactions during the bust is the same than the one used for the boom. Also, being the 
treatment variable and the instrument the same in the two cases, we are going to use al-
so the same 2SLS specification than before. Therefore, for reasons of space, we only pre-
sent the average results for the detailed spending and revenue categories shown in the 
Table 4 above for the boom period. The results of the bust are presented in Table 8 be-
low. Several results are worth highlighting. First, for each 100 euros of construction 
windfalls during the boom, spending is cut by 71 euros during the subsequent bust. Sec-
ond, around 70% of this cut corresponds to capital spending (51 euros) and just 30% 
corresponds to current spending (20 euros). Recall that the increase in total spending 
during the boom was of a similar dimension (65 euros), but was allocated mainly to cur-
rent rather than to capital spending (45 vs. 19 euros). Notice also that wage spending is 
not adjusted at all during the bust, while it absorbed a considerable proportion of the 
windfall during the boom (28 euros or around 40% of the spending increase). Thus, it 
would appear that increases in some spending categories are very tempting during 
boom periods and yet very difficult to reverse during busts. Third, the rest of the ad-
justment during the bust corresponds to a decrease in savings of around 16 euros and a 
tax increase of 14 euros. The savings coefficient is somewhat smaller than the one cor-
responding to the boom, and the one of taxes is larger than the one estimated for the 
boom period. This might be indicative of the pressure to adjust the budget felt by munic-
ipalities during the bust. 
Table 8: Average effect during the Bust. 2SLS results. 
        Spending 
   Total Capital Current Wage  Purchases Transfers 
              
Construction rev. p.c 
(∆cboom) 
-0.713 
(-3.06)** 
-0.511 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.202 
(-2.44)** 
0.020 
(0.33) 
-0.129 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.076 
(-2.71)*** 
        
Savings 
Tax Revenues 
Grants   Total Property Other 
      
      Construction rev. p.c 
(∆cboom) 
-0.160 
(-1.67)* 
0.140 
(1.89) * 
0.100 
(1.72)* 
0.039 
(0.32) 
0.020 
(0.21) 
            Notes: (1) The table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of the increase in construction revenues p.c. dur-
ing the boom (1995-2007) on several budget items during the bust (2007-2011). (2) The instrument used 
is the amount of vacant land p.c. in 1995; in the estimation we control for urban area and distance-to-
central-city interval fixed effects. (3) See Tables 2 and 3. 
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Finally, note that intergovernmental grants play no role in the adjustment. There is 
therefore no evidence that governments that spend the windfall during the boom ended 
up with a bailout when these revenues vanished during the bust. This suggest that rea-
son that governments over-spent during the bust was not that they though that some-
one would help them if these revenues end up disappearing later on. 
Heterogeneous effects. In this section we study whether there are differences among 
municipalities in the speed and type of adjustment to the loss of construction revenues 
experienced during the bust. We inquire into whether municipalities with secular low 
levels of voter information and high levels of electoral competition also behaved differ-
ently during the bust. In Table 9 we present the results for the interactions with press 
circulation and vote margin. The results for the other proxies of fiscal myopia are very 
similar to these ones and are available upon request. The results reported in the table 
suggest that municipalities with higher press circulation and larger voter margins enact 
smaller spending cuts when the windfall disappears during the bust period. Note, how-
ever, that these municipalities actually enact larger tax increases and, as a result they 
end up suffering from lower deficits. Note also that (with the exception of tax revenues) 
the coefficients for spending and savings are much smaller than the ones corresponding 
to the boom period and that the standard errors are larger (compare with Table 5).  
Table 9: Fiscal myopia. Bust period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%,15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
 
Figure 6 displays the marginal effects corresponding to press circulation and vote 
margin for the three fiscal outcomes analysed. Note how spending cuts are smaller in 
the municipalities with lower levels of press circulation (at one standard deviation be-
low the mean we can not discard that the value is one). In contrast, municipalities with 
high press circulation also enact much higher tax increases (at one standard deviation 
below the mean there are no tax increases while at one standard deviation above the 
mean we can reject the null that tax increases are zero). As a result the impact on sav-
ings also grows with press circulation. The point estimate is zero at one standard devia-
tion above the mean while is a deficit of around -0.3 arises at one standard deviation be-
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 
-0.726 
(-4.15)*** 
-0.713 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.722 
(-2.66)** 
-0.160 
(1.66)* 
-0.170 
(-1.73)* 
-0.161 
(1.59) 
0.137 
(1.89)* 
0.145 
(2.32)** 
0.143 
(2.18)** 
  × Press  circulation  p.c. 0.001 
(1.18) 
--.-- 0.001 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.41) 
--.-- 0.002 
(1.34) 
0.009 
(2.15)** 
--.-- 0.009 
(2.04)** 
  × % Vote margin 
--.-- 
0.001 
(1.11) 
 
0.001 
(1.04) 
 
--.-- 
0.009 
(0.93) 
0.093 
(1.23) 
--.-- 
0.011 
(1.30) 
0.011 
(1.28) 
K-P statistic 9.56 9.11 7.30 9.556 9.11 7.30 9.556 9.11 7.30 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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low the mean. In any case, we cannot reject that the marginal effects are zero at 5% lev-
el, irrespective of the level of press circulation. The effect is similar in the case of elec-
toral competition. The main difference is that in this case the reaction of spending does 
not depend at all on the voter margin. The vote margin does matter however for the re-
action of taxes. Municipalities with high vote margins are able to raise taxes much more 
and thanks to that they did not run a deficit. Again, the result on the deficit is a little 
fragile, since we are also not able to reject the null that the effect is also zero at one de-
viation below the mean.  
The conclusion of this section is that the influence of voter information and elec-
toral competition is different during booms than during busts. During booms, local gov-
ernments in places with uninformed voters and contested elections end up spending too 
much and taxing too little and, as a result, do not save enough (or incur in deficits larger 
than what should be). During busts, these municipalities have problems in raising taxes 
and have to cut spending more than other municipalities, and end up generating deficits.  
Figure 5: Fiscal myopia. Bust period. Marginal effects. 
(i) Spending p.c. (∆eboom). (ii) Savings p.c. (∆sboom). (iii) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom). 
Panel (a): Press circulation p.c. 
   
Panel (a): % Vote margin 
   
Notes: (1) Effect of an increase in construction revenues during the boom at different levels of Press circulation and 
% Vote margin. (2) Marginal effects computed using results from column (3) of Table A.6. 
The asymmetries between boom and bust might be partly due to the fact that cred-
it constraints –that were irrelevant during the boom- become extremely binding during 
the recession (see, e.g., Bentolila et al., 2016). This forced fast adjustments in local budg-
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ets. The fact that the adjustment was complete in municipalities with informed voters 
and low competition –the ones that saved most during the boom- can be explained by 
the fact that they were not able to accumulate liquid assets during the boom. Instead of 
that they probably just reduced their debt stock during the boom; in normal times, this 
would have been sufficient to obtain the required credit during the bust, but in the ab-
sence of liquidity they might also have had to cut spending/raise taxes. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the effect of a large, temporary revenue windfall on local 
budgets, using as our case study the Spanish housing boom-bust of 1995-2011. As we 
have shown, Spanish local governments are overly reliant on taxes and other revenue 
sources associated with the construction sector. Revenues from these sources are, 
moreover, highly unstable, rising steeply during booms but virtually disappearing during 
busts. We have documented that, in addition to their temporary nature, these windfalls 
had a massive impact on local budgets both during the boom and the bust. Further, our 
results suggest that, on average, local governments saved only a very small proportion of 
these windfalls for leaner times, preferring to fund spending increases and to cut taxes, 
with a marked impact on current spending and, especially, wage spending. During the 
bust, when the windfall was converted into a shortfall, capital spending was cut abruptly 
while current spending proved resistant to cuts. Likewise, during the bust, deficits ap-
peared and taxes were raised more than the corresponding cuts made during the boom. 
We also document that local government behaviour during the boom differed great-
ly depending on the level of voter information and electoral competition. In municipali-
ties with high press circulation and less competitive elections, the boom windfalls were 
largely saved, while in municipalities with low levels of voter information and contested 
elections, these extraordinary revenues were mostly spent and (to lesser extent) used to 
reduce taxes. These results remained unchanged after considering alternative stories, as 
liquidity constraints or irrational expectations. These characteristics also matter for the 
response during the bust: places with less informed voters had to apply stronger spend-
ing adjustments, and these places and also those with more competitive elections were 
unable to raise taxes during the bust, so they ended up generating some deficits. The fact 
that places with more informed voters and less competitive elections choose to adjust 
the budget through tax increases (and not by generating deficits) might be due to the 
general scarcity of credit that afflicted local governments during the Great Recession.  
Given the findings, the question arises as to whether policy actions should be im-
plemented to address this problem. Note, however, that Spanish local governments have 
been able to adjust fully to the impact of the construction-revenue crisis in a relatively 
short period. Yet, despite this adjustment, the excessive cyclical volatility of revenues 
and spending may constitute a real problem. For instance, abrupt cuts to infrastructure 
spending during a bust might be detrimental while an excessive amount of wage spend-
ing might also constitute a burden for the future. So, what solutions are available? First, 
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the problem derives from the excessive volatility of revenues, which implies that actions 
should be taken to ensure that revenues related to land use are not a source of windfall 
gains. One suggestion that has already been forwarded is the creation of a ‘rainy-day’ or 
stabilization fund, to be managed by the central government (see de la Fuente, 2014; 
Lago and Solé-Ollé, 2016). Second, it is of paramount importance that greater transpar-
ency in the management of these revenues (i.e., ensuring citizens are aware of how they 
are put to use), and of finances in general, is achieved. The disclosure of information by 
Spanish municipalities has improved since the financial crisis (thanks both to the in-
crease in central government requirements and to a more aware citizenship), but more 
has to be done. 
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Appendix. Additional tables and figures 
 
   
Table A1:  Variable definitions and data sources  
 
Definition Sources 
 
(a) Budget variables 
Construction revenues  Betterment tax (‘Impuesto sobre Incremento 
del Valor de los Terrenos de Naturaleza Urba-
na’) + Construction tax (‘Impuesto sobre Cons-
trucciones Instalaciones y Obras) + Develo-
pers fees (‘Licencia de obras’ y ‘Cuotas de 
promotor’) + Land sales ( ‘Enajenación de te-
rrenos) 
  Ministerio de Hacienda y Adminis-
traciones Públicas: “Estadísticas 
sobre liquidaciones de los presu-
puestos de las Entidades Locales”, 
http://www.minhafp.gob.es/, se-
veral years 
Spending  Total spending (current + capital) 
Current spending Spending on Wages, Purchases and Current 
transfers 
Capital spending Public investment + Capital transfers 
Tax revenues  Total revenues (Taxes + Fees + Current + Cap-
ital grants) – Construction revenues 
Ordinary revenues Revenues from Taxes + Fees – Construction 
taxes and Fees 
Grants Current + Capital grants 
Debt burden  Interest + Debt principal 
Net savings Current revenues – Current spending – Debt 
principal 
Revenue persistence Estimated coefficient of a regression between 
construction revenues per capita in 2004-07 
and construction revenues per capita in 1999-
2003 
  
(b) Housing variables 
Vacant land p.c. (v0) 
Amount of land (hectares) qualified as devel-
opable in the Master Plan but not yet devel-
oped at the start of the boom (in 1995) 
  DCG, Dirección General del Catas-
tro: “Estadísticas sobre ordenan-
zas fiscales del Impuesto sobre 
Bienes Inmuebles”, http://www. 
catastro.meh.es /, several years 
   INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica: “Censo de Población y Vi-
viendas”, several years 
Building density Amount of developed land per capita 
Property value p.c. Assessed value of all housed in the municipali-
ty 
Housing price growth Average growth rate of housing prices (per 
m2) in the urban area during 1995-2007 
  TINSA, Tasaciones Inmobiliarias 
https://www.tinsa.es 
 
 
INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica: “Censo de Población y Vi-
viendas” http://www.ine.es/, se-
veral year 
Housing construction rate New housing units build in the municipality 
during the period 1995-2007 as a % of the 
housing stock in 1995 
    Past housing construction rate Idem than housing construction rate but for 
the periods 1960-1986 and 1987-1995) 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Definition Sources 
 
(c) Socio-economic variables 
Press readership p.c. Number of daily newspapers (excluding the 
sports ones) sold in the province/Population 
in the province  
Spanish media association (AIMC, 
www.aimc.es) 
# Civic associations Number of associations in the province Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 
Registro Nacional de Asociaciones, 
http://www.interior.gob.es/ 
% Vote margin   (vote share first party – vote share second 
party), using data from the 1979, 1983, 1987 
and 1991 local elections. 
 
Ministerio del Interior, Base Histó-
rica de Resultados Electorales, 
http://www. eleccio-
nes.mir.es/MIR/jsp /resultados 
index.htm, several years 
   
% Left vote  Vote share left wing parties, using data from 
the 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1991 local elections. 
Tenure in office Maximum # of Terms of office held by the 
same party since 1979 
Income p.c. Personal income / Resident population La Caixa: ‘Anuario Económico de 
España’,  several years 
   
Population size Resident population   
% Old Resident population older than 65 / Popula-
tion 
 
% College education  Resident population with a college degree / 
Population 
% Immigrants  Resident population born outside the 
EU/Population 
INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica: “Censo de Población y Vi-
viendas 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 
2001 and 2011” 
http://www.ine.es/ 
 
% Unemployed Resident population unemployed/population 
%Renters Rental housing units / housing units 
%Commuters Resident population working outside the mu-
nicipality / population 
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Table A.2:  Determinants of Vacant land 
  
Dependent variable: Vacant land p.c. (v0) 
  
     
 Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
     
 a) Housing demand  
  
Past housing growth (1987-1995)  10.211 
(5.92)*** 
11.045 
(6.36)*** 
4.032 
(0.85) 
3.045 
(0.72) 
Past housing growth (1960-1986) -2.281 
(-1.94)*** 
-1.622 
(-1.31) 
-0.431 
(-00.56) 
-0.522 
(-0.47) 
Population  -0.009 
(-1.77)* 
-0.009 
(-2.52)** 
-0.002 
(-1.10) 
-0.002 
(-1.12) 
     
    b) Preferences and fiscal stress 
  % Vote margin 
--.-- 
0.089 
(0.840) 
--.-- 
0.043 
(0.540) 
% Left vote  
--.-- 
-0.770 
(-0.842) 
--.-- 
-0.520 
(-1.442) 
Income p.c. 
--.-- 
-0.009 
(0.752) 
--.-- 
-0.005 
(0.833) 
% Tertiary education  
--.-- 
-0.261 
(-1.278) 
--.-- 
-0.202 
(-0.442) 
%Renters 
--.-- 
0.029 
(0.198) 
--.-- 
0.021 
(0.110) 
%Commuters 
--.-- 
-0.006 
(-0.617) 
--.-- 
-0.004 
(-0.341) 
Debt burden p.c. 
--.-- 
0.125 
(1.331) 
--.-- 
0.132 
(0.340) 
Spending p.c. 
--.-- 
0.087 
(0.882) 
--.-- 
0.101 
(0.103) 
Property value p.c. 
--.-- 
0.217 
(0.954) 
--.-- 
0.245 
(0.420) 
     
     
R2 (adj.) 0.256 0.251 0.356 0.351 
     
     
F-stat (a) 23.94 
(0.000) 
20.99 
(0.000) 
3.21 
(0.122) 
1.87 
(0.130) 
F-stat (b) 
--.-- 
0.72 
(0.587) 
--.-- 
0.38 
(0.687) 
F-stat (fj & fk) --.-- --.-- 
35.22 
(0.000) 
33.71 
(0.000) 
Urban area fixed effects (fj) NO YES NO YES 
Distance-to-central city fixed effects (fk) NO YES NO YES 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is Vacant land per capita (in 1995); (2) Sample: municipalities larger 
than 1,000 inhabitants and with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas 
(N=495); (2) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. *** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% lev-
els; standard errors clustered by province; (2) F-stat (a), F-stat (b) & F-stat (fj & fk) are the F-statistic 
used for the test of joint significance of Housing demand variables, the Preferences  and Fiscal stress var-
iables, and the urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects, respectively; values in pa-
renthesis are standard errors. (3) Dependent variable is Vacant land p.c., measured as the amount 
zoned for development in 1995 but not yet developed, divided by resident population in 1995. See Ta-
ble A.1 for definitions and sources of the variables. 
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Table A.3:  Effect of Vacant land on alternative channels 
Notes: (1) Effects on changes in different outcomes from the period prior to the boom (1993-95) to the peak of 
the boom (2004-2007); (2) See Table A.1 for definitions of the variables; (3) All equations include urban area 
and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; (4) Sample: municipalities larger than 1,000 inhabitants and 
with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas (N=495); (5) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. 
*** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard errors clustered by province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4:  Effect of Vacant land boom and pre-boom budget changes 
 Notes: (1) Effects on changes in different budget variables during the boom (i.e., from the period 1993-1995 to 
the period 2004-2007) and during the period previous to the boom (i.e., from 1993-95 to 1996-97); (2) All 
equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; (3) Sample: municipalities 
larger than 1,000 inhabitants and with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas 
(N=495); (4) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. *** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; 
standard errors clustered by province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)       (2)              (3)              (4)       (5)         (6)            (7) 
  ∆ over the boom period in: 
 Construction 
revenues 
Ordinary 
revenues 
Population 
growth 
Income 
per capita 
Building 
density 
% Immi-
grants 
% 
Young 
Vacant land 
p.c. (v0) 
0.234 
(4.21)*** 
0.042 
(2.23)** 
0.004 
(1.77)* 
0.001 
(0.34) 
-0.021 
(-0.23) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.121) 
R2 (adj.) 0.406 0.302 0.256 0.220 0.110 0.162 0.154 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆ over the boom period in: ∆ over the pre-boom period in: 
 Spending p.c. 
(∆eboom) 
Savings p.c. 
(∆sboom) 
Tax revenues 
p.c. (∆tboom) 
Spending p.c. 
(∆e0) 
Savings p.c. 
(∆s0) 
Tax revenues 
p.c. (∆t0) 
Vacant land 
p.c. (v0) 
0.156 
(2.77)*** 
0.059 
(1.76)* 
-0.027 
(-1.95)* 
0.004 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
R2 (adj.) 0.362 0.281 0.299 0.112 0.098 0.075 
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Table A.5: Average effect on main budget items. OLS results. 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(∆cboom) 
1.061 
(11.43)*** 
0.945 
(9.06)*** 
0.947 
(8.08)*** 
1.082 
(9.54)*** 
0.981 
(8.44)*** 
R2 0.433 0.585 0.595 0.589 0.619 
            
 (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(∆cboom) 
  -0.033 
(-0.044) 
0.051 
(0.170) 
0.061 
(0.151) 
-0.056 
(-0.618) 
0.044 
(0.363) 
R2 0.107 0.371 0.393 0.401 0.428 
              
 (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
  
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(∆cboom) 
0.011 
 (0.211) 
-0.012 
(-0.343) 
-0.015 
(-0.763) 
-0.015 
(-0.191) 
-0.020 
(-0.77) 
R2 0.047 0.293 0.331 0.342 0.354 
            
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central-city fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand shocks  NO NO YES NO NO 
Preferences and fiscal stress  NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      
       Notes:  See Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table A.6: Fiscal myopia. Additional measures. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%,15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (∆eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (∆sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (∆tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (∆cboom) 
0.638 
(2.82)*** 
0.634 
(2.77)*** 
0.634 
(2.77)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.225 
(2.01)** 
0.236 
(2.01)** 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.116 
(-2.02)** 
-0.123 
(-2.23)** 
  × % College education -0.017 
(-2.29)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.021 
(2.74)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.003 
(0.67) 
--.-- --.-- 
  × Tenure in office 
--.-- 
-0.010 
(-1.62) 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.015 
(1.53) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.32) 
--.-- 
  × # Civic associations 
--.-- --.-- 
0.002 
(0.08) 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.13) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.000 
(0.28) 
K-P statistic 9.91 9.44 8.67 9.91 9.44 8.67 9.91 9.44 8.67 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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Figure A.1:   
Construction revenues v. Ordinary taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Ordinary taxes include revenues from taxes and fees not in-
cluded in Construction revenues: (2) Revenues from ordinary taxes 
computed with constant nominal tax rates and in real terms; (3) See 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure A.2:   
 Share of construction revenues in the budget in % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Share of construction revenues measured over non-financial 
revenues; (2) Soid line is a Kernel epachenikov fit; dashed line is the 
mean of the respective period; (3) Outlay data; (4) See Table A.1 for def-
initions and data sources.  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es), “Base de 
datos de liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales”. 
 
 43
 
 
 
Figure A.3:   
Growth of construction revenues. Boom & Bust. 
Boom Bust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Growth in construction revenues per capita. Boom: revenues in period 2004-2007 minus revenues in 
period 1993-1995; Bust: revenues in period 2008-11 minus revenues in period 2004-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4:  
Land use categories in Spain 
 
 
 
                                    
 
                                                                       →                                                                  → 
 
 
 
 
                   a) Before Plans’ amendment           b) After Plans’ amendment                        c) After construction 
 
 
Notes: (1) Yellow: ‘Non-developable’ land (i.e., rural uses or protected); Orange: ‘Developed’ land before the 
amendment of the Master Plan (and before the construction that follows the implementation of the new 
plan); Pink: ‘Developable’ land before the amendment of the Master Plan (and also after); Purple: Developable 
land after the amendment of the plan but not before (i.e., amount of land converted from rural to urban uses 
between as a result of the amendment): Red: ‘Developed’ land with the new plan (i.e., construction that takes 
places once the new plan has been implemented). (2) The amount of vacant land at different moments is de-
noted with different colours: in graph (a) vacant land is denoted with Pink, in Panel (b) is Pink + Purple, and 
in Panel (c) is only Purple. 
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Figure A.5:   
Example of land delimitation in a Master Plan 
 
Notes: (1) Master Land Use Plan (POUM) of Granollers (60,000 residents, 15 miles from 
Barcelona): Orange and Blue: Developed land (Residential and Industrial, respectively), 
Pink and Purple (Developable, Residential and Industrial, respectively), Yellow: Non de-
velopable; White: out of the city’s jurisdiction (but regulated by neighbouring cities). 
Black line: jurisdictional border. Border between Yellow and any other colour is the De-
velopment border. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.6: Instrument’s logic 
Evolution of vacant land over time: 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) The figure depicts the evolution of vacant land (v) of two hypothetical municipalities (A and B) 
across two housing cycles (1 and 2), each with a Boom and a Bust period; the sub-index A or B indicates mu-
nicipality, the super index 1 and 2 indicates housing cycle, and the super index 0 indicates that vacant land is 
measured at the start of the housing boom. (2) The story begins with the implementation of a new Master 
Plan that supplies the same amount of vacant land for the two municipalities (N^D,	  N_D,	); during Boom 1, 
however, the rate of housing construction in municipality B is (unexpectedly) lower than in A, meaning that 
vacant land depleted at a lower rate too; during Bust 1 construction stops and vacant land remains constant; 
during Boom 2 the housing construction rate is the same in the two municipalities until municipality B be-
gins the process of amending the Master Plan, which slows housing construction.  
N^
D,	
 N_
D,	 
 
N^
D, 
N_
D,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